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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Is a Petition for Review ; * z\w Industrie. Commission's 
May * < f 
entitlement dependents' benefits ; ,,\ death ; .*. , ajured 
workei ;« Review of that Order was timely filed with 
t 
This Court - u. i^ictirr *~~ hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant • * . ;• Annotates actions 3^-1-82, si \,\ (I98h) 
3 5- Il 8 6 MI 1 \\ I I I i I 
( 1 9 8 8 ) ; „,- -i* - .-.• Kuies o: Appellate Procedure. 
• STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are two substantia issues presented for review: 
(1) whether the statute repose contained i n Utah Code 
A •: - * --• v. . -^ 3b™-I"b c- unconstituti onal as 
contrary t\ • - .sen Courts" provision i ' i rtan Constitution; 
and 
(2) whether t: * tatute repose contained :« IJtah Code 
Annotated, Section - - ;^79) :i s unconstitutional as 
depriving Petitioners of their riqht to equal protect l 'JUI oil 1 11<••» l a i i 
under til le I J tal I Constitution. 
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution tin. above issues is " M • I IUII ul ii'im '^  
s ince they . ques t i oris o f ] aw, ai id i ic: • deference to the 
agency's view oi the Jaw is necessary required. Utah 
Admi ri i st rat i\ -e P u n MI I i i • •. Ai I , hi ihi Ccnip - S e c t in u'i ,>'•!. - 4 i b 
1 
16 (4) (d) (1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 
328 (Utah 1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division 
of the Utah State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (1896) [Courts 
open - Redress of injuries] and Article I, Section 24 (1896) 
[Uniform operation of laws], along with Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-68 (1979) are the applicable determinative 
constitutional and statutory provisions. See Addendum Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioners seek review of the Industrial Commission Order 
denying their Motion for Review wherein they sought dependents' 
benefits due to the death of David K. Hales, who was injured in an 
industrial accident on May 24, 1982 and died over 6 years later on 
November 25, 1988, allegedly as a result of his industrial 
accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
On March 23, 1989 and March 31, 1989, as required by Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) (a) (1979), Petitioners, as Mr. 
Hales7 dependents, filed dependents' death claims within one year 
of his demise alleging that Mr. Hales' demise was occasioned by his 
1982 industrial accident. Emery Mining Corporation, Mr. Hales7 
Employer, and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Energy 
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Mutual Insurance Company, denied responsibility for death benefits 
based on the limitation found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-
68 (2) (1979) which provides in relevant part that "In case injury 
causes death within the period of six years from the date of the 
accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial 
expenses as provided in Section 35-1-81 ..." and other compensation 
as provided in Section 68. 
Disposition Below 
On April 3, 1992 the Administrative Law Judge held that 
Petitioners' claims were barred by the six-year statute of 
limitations found in Section 68. Because Mr. Hales was injured in 
an industrial accident on May 24, 1982 and died over six years 
later on November 25, 1988, allegedly as a result of his industrial 
accident, Petitioners' claims were held to be forever barred. The 
Administrative Law Judge did note, however, that the reasoning of 
a prior decision of this Court (Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 
786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990), cert, den. , 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990) "... might be said to be analogous ...", but he declined to 
rule on Petitioners7 constitutional challenge of Section 68. (R. at 
103-110; and See Addendum Exhibit B.) 
On April 17, 1992 Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with 
the Industrial Commission of Utah alleging, inter alia, that the 
statutory provision contained in Section 68 violated the Utah 
Constitution's "Open Courts" and "Equal Protection" provisions by 
extinguishing their constitutional right to litigate a valid claim 
before their right to file their claim arose, and treating 
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dependents of injured workers who die before six years from the 
date of the industrial accident differently than those of injured 
workers who die after six years from the date of the industrial 
accident, (R. at 108-111). 
On May 6, 1992 the Industrial Commission affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order; however, the Industrial 
Commission noted in denying Petitioners' Motion for Review that "In 
view of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission. 786 P.2d 243 [(Utah 
App.] 1990 I" ,cert. den. , 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990)] and the Velarde 
Tv. Industrial Commission, 184 Ut. Adv. Rep. 79 (Utah Ct. App. , 
filed, April 14, 1992)] case which was decided after the instant 
case, it is apparent that Section 35-1-68 (2) [1979] is likely to 
be declared unconstitutional." (R. at 118-120; and See Addendum 
Exhibit C). Nevertheless, and like the Administrative Law Judge, 
the Industrial Commission declined to rule on the constitutional 
question raised by Petitioners' Motion for Review indicating that 
such questions were beyond the agency's limited jurisdiction and 
that it would have to be addressed to this Court. 
Statement of the Facts 
The facts in this matter are not in dispute or at issue. 
On May 24, 1982 the deceased, David K. Hales, sustained a 
compensable accident while employed by Emery Mining Corporation. 
(R. at 103) . On that date, Mr. Hales was involved in an 
underground coal mine cave-in from which he suffered severe and 
unrelenting medical problems for the remainder of his life. (R. at 
103). 
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He was initially paid temporary, total disability 
compensation, and was awarded 32% permanent, partial disability 
compensation for orthopedic and internal medical problems, and for 
anxiety, depression and intractable pain. (R. at 103). He 
continued to suffer from his industrial injuries which eventually 
culminated in his being awarded permanent, total disability 
compensation. (R. at 58-62). 
On November 25, 1988, Mr. Hales was found dead at his home by 
his wife. (R. at 79). Petitioners subsequently filed dependents' 
death claims alleging that Mr. Hales7 demise was occasioned by his 
1982 industrial accident. (R. at 78) . Those claims were denied as 
detailed above. Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the 
Industrial Commission on April 17, 1992 ( R. at 115), but it was 
denied on May 6, 1992 (R. at 118-120). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
Petitioners allege that Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 
(2) (1979) violates the Utah Constitution's "Open Courts" 
provision. Petitioners' submit that the statute which permits an 
industrial death claim by dependents only in cases where the 
deceased dies within six years form the date of the industrial 
accident is an unconstitutional statute of repose because it 
deprives them of a cause of action before their claim for death 
benefits ever arose, i.e., when Mr. Hales died. 
The deceased was injured in an industrial accident on May 24, 
1982 and died on November 25, 1988, over six years after the 
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occurrence of his industrial injury. Petitioners allege that the 
industrial injury was the underlying cause of his death and filed 
their dependents' claims based thereon. Because the cause of 
action did not arise until Mr. Hales7 death, Petitioners' claim 
could not have been filed until he died - if at all - which in this 
case was after the six year statute of limitation period provided 
for in Section 68 had expired. Petitioners should not now be 
penalized by being denied death benefits based upon Mr. Hales' 
failure to die before the expiration of the six year period of time 
following his industrial accident as provided for by Section 68. 
Petitioners submit that Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 
(2) (1979) is contrary to the "Open Courts" provision of the Utah 
Constitution. See Wrolstad, supra and Velarde, supra. It is 
difficult to distinguish this case from these two prior rulings of 
this Court involving statutes of repose in industrial compensation 
matters. Interestingly enough, even Respondent Industrial 
Commission of Utah acknowledges that the challenged statute in this 
case is "likely to be declared unconstitutional. (R. at 118). In 
addition, in response to the Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Disposition essentially raising this argument, Respondents Emery 
Mining Corporation and Energy Mutual Insurance Company on July 10, 
1992 conceded that the analysis and ruling in the Velarde, supra, 
case applies to Section 68 in this case. 
And finally, the Petitioners further submit that the "Equal 
Protection" provision of the Utah Constitution requirement that all 
laws have uniform operation which has been interpreted as requiring 
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that "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly" 
further underscores the inequitable treatment of dependents whose 
deceased dies before as distinguished from those whose deceased 
dies after six years from the date of their respective industrial 
accidents, and who desire to file a claim for death benefits under 
Section 68. There can be no rational justification for the 
disparity which results since they have no control over the event 
which determines timeliness of the filing of a claim, i.e., the 
date of the injured worker's demise. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS CORRECTION OF 
ERROR WITH NO DEFERENCE TO THE COMMISSION'S VIEW OF THE 
LAW, 
This case was commenced after the effective date of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Annotated, Section 
63-46b-l et. seq. (1989), and is thus subject to the standard of 
review set forth in that act. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63,66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
As under prior law, the determination of the appropriate 
standard of review turns on whether the issue presented is one of 
law, fact, or a question of mixed law and fact. There is no 
question that this dispute involves a pure question of law and such 
was recognized by the Industrial Commission in its Denial of Motion 
for Review. (R. at 118-120). 
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The central and essential issues presented on appeal deals 
with the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Such issues 
are questions of law, which under Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988) of 
the UAPA are reviewed pursuant to the "correction-of error" 
standard with no deference to the agency's view of the law being 
required. Bevans v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 790 P. 2d 573 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)• 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize 
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
compensation is to be resolved in favor of Petitioners' claims. 
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 
1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). McPhie v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). 
II 
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 35-1-68 (2) (1981) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
VIOLATING THE "OPEN COURTS" PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, 
The so called "Open Courts" provision of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (1896) provides in material 
part that "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law...." This constitutional 
provision has been construed to impose limitations on a legislature 
when it passes laws which modify the rights of those persons who 
have been injured in their person, property or reputation. 
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The proper analysis for determining whether a statute of 
repose unconstitutionally violates the "Open Courts11 provision of 
the Utah Constitution was clearly delineated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
Berry sets forth a two-pronged approach: (1) the law must provide 
the injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy; 
and (2) if there is no substantial and alternative remedy there 
must be a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
means selected must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. 
A careful examination of those two prongs reveals that neither 
can be satisfied under Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) 
(1979). 
A. EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY. 
Petitioners did not have an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy in this case for the simple reason that they 
could not file for dependents' benefits in a death claim until the 
injured worker died. The dependents of an injured worker who 
manages to survive for six years or more after his industrial 
injury and then succumbs are left wholly without remedy, if the six 
year statute of repose is constitutional. 
There is no provision in the Workers' Compensation Act or 
other law which would allow one to file for speculative loss or 
impairment which does not presently exist, but which could 
conceivably come into existence in the future. 
The Court in Wrolstad, supra at 245, acknowledged that "a 
person can't file an occupational disease claim for a disease he 
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does not know he has." Likewise, Petitioners could not file their 
dependents7 death claims within six years of the date of the 
accident as required by the statute because they did not know, nor 
could anyone have known, that Mr. Hales was going to subsequently 
die from the injuries he suffered from the industrial accident. It 
is precisely that fact which makes the statute one of repose and 
not limitation. 
Professor Larson cites the clear problems and fundamental 
unfairness that such a repose statute creates: 
The classic illustration is that of the apparently 
trivial accident that matures into a disabling injury 
after the claim period has expired. A workman is struck 
in the eye by a metal chip, but both he and the company 
doctors dismiss the accident as a petty one, and of 
course no claim is made, since there is no present injury 
or disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops 
as the direct result of the accident. If the statute 
bars claims filed more than one year after the 
Occident,' and if the court applies the statutory 
language with medieval literalism, the workman can never 
collect for the injury no matter how diligent he is: he 
cannot claim during the year because no compensable 
injury exists; he cannot claim after the year, because 
the statute runs from the accident. 2B Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Section 78.42(a), page 15-262 (1989). 
* * * 
Limitations periods are of course constitutional in 
general, but is such a period valid when it begins to run 
before a claim exists and assumes to destroy it before it 
is born? Is it not elementary that the running of the 
period must be related to the time of acquisition of the 
enforceable right, rather that of some event which may or 
may not coincide with that acquisition? Suppose a 
statute were passed which said that, in the event of any 
highway collision, suit must be commenced within two 
years of the last presidential election. This is in no 
way any sillier or more oppressive than a statute which 
says that a man who gets a bit of grime in his eye in 
1960 which causes only slight irritation must bring a 
claim for blindness within one year of that time— 
blindness that does not develop until 1962. 2B Larson, 
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Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 78.42(e), page 15-
272.5 (1989). 
Since the filing of a claim against the employer and/or its 
workers compensation insurance carrier must be filed with the 
Industrial Commission of Utah because of the exclusive remedy 
doctrine, Petitioners' inability to file their claims in this case 
through the industrial system because of the six year statute of 
limitation found in Section 68 does not provide them with any 
alternative, equal legal remedy for redressing their loss. 
Thus, since Petitioners had no substitute equal alternative 
remedy to the one barred by the six year statute of repose, the 
statute can only be upheld if it passes the second prong of the 
Berry analysis. 
B. EXISTENCE OF CLEAR SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC EVIL. 
Under the Berry second prong, the purpose of the six year 
statue of repose must be to eliminate a clear social or economic 
evil. In addition, the statutes's extermination of Petitioners' 
remedy must not be an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving 
the objective. Berry at 680. To determine whether there is a 
clear social or economic evil, a due process type "balancing 
analysis" is to be applied which weighs the particular infringement 
on the Article I, Section 11 interest against the justifications 
offered for the restriction. Id. at 679-80. 
Under the rule announced in Velarde, if the first prong of 
Berry is found violated, as is argued above, then the burden shifts 
to the Respondents to demonstrate the statute's constitutionality 
under the Berry second prong. Id. at 9. The Respondents below 
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utterly fail to carry this burden forward and in fact conceded that 
the statute is unconstitutional. (R. at 118). 
The public policy of the Utah Workers Compensation Act is to 
alleviate hardship upon workers and their families when disabling, 
work-related injuries occur, and the statute is to be construed 
liberally to afford coverage to an injured worker during a time of 
need. Produce v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 562 P. 2d 1354 
(Utah 1983); Baker v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 405 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1965). "Furthermore, to facilitate the purposes of the 
legislation, the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in 
favor of the applicant." Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
800 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah App. 1990), and cases cited therein. 
Against this interest the Respondents must demonstrate that 
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated. The 
Legislature in enacting the six year statute of repose did not make 
legislative findings as the purpose the statute of repose was to 
serve. The social or economic evil argument simply does not apply 
to the facts of this case. 
Mr. Hales' accident was promptly reported to his employers and 
Respondents have had the benefit of medical records over a 
considerable period of time. The existence of his industrial 
accident was established and he was awarded benefits accordingly. 
(R. at 228 and 258-62) . Respondents can point to no difficulty and 
certainly no impossibility in defending the causation or existence 
of injuries in this matter. As the Court in Sun Valley Water Beds 
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v, Hughes & Son, 782 P. 2d 118, 193 (Utah 1989) remarked in 
rejecting the same argument: "While the passage of time causes 
inherent difficulty in defending any lawsuit, it also causes equal, 
if not greater, difficult in initiating just legal action." 
Additionally, the same economic evil argument was made 
unsuccessfully by the Respondents in Velarde. In that case this 
Court held as follows: 
We are not persuaded that easing an employees burden in 
proving causation is an economic interest that rises to 
the level of a clear economic evil. Moreover, Kennecott 
makes no showing that the statute actually achieves the 
stated legislative purpose of reducing claims in which 
silicosis is actually caused by other sources. 
* * * 
This statutory scheme, which includes in its sweep the 
class of people for whom timing, rather than causation, 
is a problem, is overbroad in its application and thus 
unreasonable and arbitrary... Kennecott has thus failed 
to show that there is a clear social or economic evil to 
be eliminated by this statute of repose, and that the 
means of achieving the statute's purported economic 
objectives are not just 'an arbitrary and impermissible 
shifting of collective burdens to individual citizens.' 
(citations omitted) Id. at 11. 
Respondents here suffer from the same failure. Not only is 
there no showing that the statute actually accomplishes any 
beneficent purposes, even if it did, such a purpose would not 
outweigh Petitioner's constitutional right to a remedy. 
Ill 
THE STATUTE OP REPOSE CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED/ 
SECTION 35-1-68 (2) (1981) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
VIOLATING THE "EQUAL PROTECTION" PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
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The principle of equal protection is set forth in the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 24 (1896) as follows: "All laws 
of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that although dissimilar, this language 
embodies the same principal as the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, It embraces the notion that "persons 
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in 
different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661, 669 
(Utah 1984) . 
In assessing whether a statute meets equal protection 
standards, a court must consider the objectives of the statute and 
whether the classifications contained therein provide a reasonable 
basis for promoting these objectives: 
When persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of 
persons from among a larger class on the basis of a 
tenuous justification that has little or no merit. Id. 
at 671. 
In Velarde, supra at 12, this Court held that "Because the 
open courts provision is dispositive, we need not reach the equal 
protection question." This Court in the interest of clarity and 
brevity should adopt the same analysis and dispose of this matter 
on the "open courts" analysis provided above. 
Petitioner's argument under this point, however, is that the 
statute of repose at issue here impermissibly restricts dependents 
of an injured worker from bringing claims for dependents' benefits 
beyond an arbitrary time frame unlawfully discriminates against 
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those dependents of injured workers who somehow manage to survive 
for six years following their industrial accident and then die due 
to causes directly related to the industrial injury. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court hold that the 
statute of repose for dependents of injured workers who die more 
than six years after the industrial accident found in Utah Code 
Annotated Section 35-1-68 (2) (1979)l is unconstitutional and remand 
to the Industrial Commission of Utah for a hearing on the 
merits. 
DATED this 1st day of September, 1992. 
DABNEY & DABNEy, p 
A similar provision in the Utah Occupational Disease Code, i.e., Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-2-108 (3) (1991), for similar reasons is constitutionally 
defective, and even though it is not directly involved in this case, should also 
be addressed in any decision issued by this Court. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (1896), [Courts open - Redress of 
injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in 
his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 (1896). [Uniform operation of 
laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (1979). 
(1) There is created a second injury fund for the purpose of making 
payments in accordance with the provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of this 
title. This fund shall succeed to all monies heretofore held in that 
fund designated as the "special fund" or the "combined injury fund" and 
whenever reference is made elsewhere in this code to the "special fund" 
or the "combined injury fund" that reference shall be deemed to be to 
the second injury fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian of 
the second injury fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. 
Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of 
that fund. The attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to 
represent the second injury fund in all proceedings brought to enforce 
claims against it. 
(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the 
date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the 
burial expenses of the deceased as provided in section 35-1-81, and 
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no 
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from 
the date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for 
the employer or insurance carrier to pay into the second injury fund the 
sum of $18,720. The $18,720 shall be reduced by the amount of any 
weekly compensation payments paid to or due the deceased between the 
date of the accident and death. Should a dependency claim be filed 
subsequent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter, a 
determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award shall 
first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to the second injury 
fund by the employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may 
be asserted against the employer or insurance carrier. In the event no 
dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of death, the 
commission's temporary order shall become permanent and final. If no 
temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has been 
filed within one year from the date of death, the commission may issue 
a permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay 
Exhibit A 
$18,720 into the second injury fund. Any claim for compensation by a 
dependent must be filed with the commission within one year from the 
date of death of the deceased. 
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the 
death, the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3% 
of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not 
more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus 
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under 
the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency 
for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to 
exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during 
dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period 
described in subsection (2) (b) (i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly 
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during that initial six-
year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal social security death 
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review 
by the commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually 
thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the 
facts and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is not 
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a 
partly dependent or non-dependent person and shall be paid such benefits 
as the commission may determine pursuant to subsection (2)(c)(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving 
spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be 
wholly dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the 
employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-year 
period and, in determining the then existing annual income of the 
surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal social 
security death benefits received by that surviving spouse. 
(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the 
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for 
the remainder of the period between the date of death and not to exceed 
six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in 
each case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of 
$18,720. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in 
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at 
the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this 
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent 
pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission 
in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing 
at the time of the dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount 
not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would 
receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such 
persons during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier. 
(d) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly 
dependent persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the 
benefits as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total 
benefits awarded to all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum 
provided for by law. 
(e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of 
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of 
dependency, including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed 
$18,72 0, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference 
between the amount paid and the sum of $18,720 into the second injury 
fund provided for in subsection (1). 
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Pursuant to a telephonic attorneys7 conference on April 2, 
1992, the parties stipulated that since this matter involves a 
threshold legal issue, no evidentiary hearing would be necessary. 
Rather, the parties and the Administrative Law Judge concurred that 
the proper forum for applicant's challenge to the constitutionality 
of Section 35-1-68 (as amended May 12, 1981) would be the Court of 
Appeals. The factual background prompting that challenge follows. 
The deceased herein, David K. Hales sustained a compensable 
industrial accident on May 24, 1982 while employed by Emery Mining. 
On that date Mr. Hales was involved in a mine cave-in which he 
suffered a "crushed pelvis and right leg". In addition to 
receiving medical care for his injuries, the injured worker was 
paid temporary total disability for the period may 25, 1982 through 
March 15, 1983. Thereafter, Mr. Hales returned to work and on 
December 27, 1983 the Commission approved a Compensation Agreement 
whereby the employer agreed to pay the Mr. Hales a 3 2% combined 
permanent partial impairment for orthopedic residual problems and 
"anxiety, depression and intractable pain". 
Unfortunately, Mr. Hales continued to have problems and in a 
visit to Dr. Hood on March 24, 1986, the Doctor noted that "[h]e 
continues to suffer periods of severe paid requiring Percodan, two 
tablets every four hours as well as use of a back brace and muscle 
relaxant." Dr. Hood concluded that Mr. Hales was not a surgical 
candidate and that "..I am very concerned about his long-term use 
of medications. 
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On or about May 31, 1988 the parties, by and through counsel, 
entered a written stipulation that Mr. Hales was permanently and 
totally disabled as the result of his industrial accident and pre-
existing conditions. Mr. Hales was placed on the Second Injury 
Fund(nka Employers Reinsurance Fund) permanent total disability 
payroll effective June 2, 1988 with lifetime benefits of$218 per 
week. 
On November 25, 1988 Mr. Hales was found dead of a multiple 
drug overdose, as the result of ingestion of codeine, meprobamate, 
diazepam, and carisoprodol. 
The Commission received Claims for Dependents Benefits on 
March 31, 1989 from the surviving spouse, Marilyn R. Hales, and 
from Robyn L. Chambers on behalf of her minor children, Delbert, 
Monica, and Cristal Hales. In reviewing the claim filed by Robyn 
Chambers I note that she has listed herself also as a dependent of 
the deceased. However, in reviewing the file I can find no 
evidence that the deceased was providing any support to Ms. 
Chambers. The divorce decree appended to her Claim indicates that 
she was awarded the nominal sum of $1 per year in alimony, hardly 
an amount sufficient to be deemed support for purposes of the 
Workers Compensation Act. Therefore, the dependency claim of Robyn 
Chambers must fail, and the same is hereby dismissed. 
However, the minor children of the deceased are entitled to 
the statutory presumption of dependency since the deceased had a 
legal obligation of support for them pursuant to the divorce 
decree. The surviving spouse, Marilyn Hales, is also entitled to a 
presumption of dependency since she was married to the deceased and 
living with him at the time of his death. 
The employer has denied liability for death benefits in this 
matter based on Section 35-1-68 (2) (as amended May 12, 1981). The 
relevant portion of that statute provides: 
* * * 
(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six 
years from the date of the accident, the employer or 
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the 
deceased as provided in section 35-1-81, ... 
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The employer argues that since the death of Mr. Hales on 
November 25, 1988 did not result within six years of the industrial 
accident of May 24, 1982, the Claims of the applicants are barred 
by the statute of limitations contained in Section 68(2), supra. 
The applicants contend that the statute of limitations provision 
being invoked by the defendants is unconstitutional, and cite as 
support Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 786 P.2d 243 (1990). 
With the issue so framed, I would note that the Wrolstad decision 
case involved an asbestosis death claim, which had been barred by 
the one year statute of repose of Section 35-2-13 (a) (2) of the 
Occupational Disease Act, while this case involves Section 35-1-
68(2) of the Workers Compensation Act. While the reasoning might 
be said to be analogous, since a different statute was interpreted 
by the Court of Appeals in Wrolstad, that decision cannot be 
applied by the Commission to the instant case in dispute. Rather, 
as stated in the prefatory remarks, the appropriate forum for 
applicants' constitutional challenge of Section 68 (2) must be the 
Court of Appeals. The Commission has been granted limited 
jurisdiction, and does not possess the necessary general 
jurisdiction to rule on questions of constitutionality. 
In view of the foregoing, I must dismiss the Claims for 
failure to comply with Section 35-1-68(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Claims of the applicants for 
death benefits should be and the same are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to comply with 35-1-68(2), Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended May 12, 1981. 
DAVID K. HALES, DECEASED 
ORDER 
PAGE FOUR 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and , unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. 
Certified this 3rd day of 
April, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April 3, 1992, a copy of the attached 
Order in the case of David K. Hales, Deceased was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
350 South 400 East, #202 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Rinehart Peshell, Esq. 
7321 South State 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
'wilma Burrows 
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DELBERT HALES, MONICA HALES, and* 
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Applicants, * 
vs. * 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT (EMERY * 
MINING) and/or ENERGY MUTUAL * 
Insurance Companies, * 
* 
Respondents, * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
This case involves a Motion for Review made by the applicants 
challenging the decision by the administrative law judge (ALJ) 
which held that U.C.A. Section 35-1-68(2) (as amended May 12, 1981) 
barred the claims of the applicants. The parties and the ALJ 
concurred, after a telephonic attorneys' conference, that the 
proper forum for applicants' challenge to the constitutionality of 
this section would be the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Notwithstanding the concurrence of the parties, the Commission 
is not sure whether the District Court or the Court of Appeals is 
the proper forum to decide the issue presented. Alumbaugh v. 
White, 800 P.2d 825 (Ut. App. 1990) indicated that cases governed 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) (U.C.A. Sections 
63-46b-l et seq.) in which hearings were not held were properly 
appealed to the District Court, and not to the Court of Appeals. 
However, in Velarde v. Bd of Review, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 70 (1992) , 
another case governed by UAPA, the Court of Appeals accepted 
jurisdiction over the case, and issued its decision even though the 
Court recognized that no formal hearing had been conducted. See 
id. fn 2. These cases were issued by two different panels of the 
Court of Appeals, but each contained one judge in common. Since 
the Velarde case is closer in terms of issue to the instant case, 
we will advise the parties that their appeal, if any, from our 
decision is to the Court of Appeals. 
In view of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 786 P.2d 243 
(1990), and the Velarde case which was decided after the instant 
case, it is apparent that Section 35-1-68(2) is likely to be 
declared unconstitutional. Since the Commission has only limited 
jurisdiction, the Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated April 3, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on May 6, 1992, a copy of the attached 
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of MARILYN R. HALES widow 
of DELBERT HALES was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Rinehart L. Peshell 
Fairbourn & Peshell 
7321 South State Street 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Virginius Dabney 
Dabney & Dabney 
350 South 400 East Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Legal Assistant 
